Abstract-In this paper, we study return policy and supply chain coordination in a channel of one supplier and one retailer. The paper assumes that unsold merchandise should been refunded to the supplier by the retailer. The retailer knows the cost of reverse logistics operations but the supplier has to estimate it. The contract menu under asymmetric reverse logistics cost information between supply chain members was designed and discussed. The goal of the supplier's contract is to coordinate the channel and then get more profit. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the supplier declares a contract menu with return price and wholesale price to the retailer and requires the retailer report the cost of reverse logistics. Then the retailer reports the cost and gets the corresponding contract. The optimal solutions of the contract menu are derived, and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the properties of the contract menu.
INTRODUCTION
Because of the existence of multiple decision makers in supply chain, the decisions that are locally optimal can be globally inefficient. It is well documented in marketing and economics literature that uncoordinated decisions lead to "double marginalization", which is one of the causes of channel inefficiency [1] , [2] . Coordination among suppliers and retailers is a very important strategic issue in supply chain management. Coordination between independent firms in a supply chain relationship has gained much attention recently and many studies have been presented. In order to provide compatible incentives to improve the supply chain performance and achieve the win-win solution, some types of supply chain contracts have been discussed. For instance, see return policies [3] , revenue sharing [4] , quantity discount [5] , quantity flexibility [6] , sales rebate [7] . See [8] for excellent reviews. The goal of these contracts is to coordinate supply chain, which means that the total profit of the decentralized supply chain will be equal to that achieved under a centralized system.
In this paper, the focus is on combined contract of wholesale price and return policy. Wholesale price is a fundamental decision for supply chain coordination in distribution channel. The "Quantity discount" is a popular method used to stimulate the retailer to order [9] . [10] shows that in complex supply chain linear quantity discount alone cannot coordinate supply chain.
The return policy is also called as buyback policy for many cases and in many researches. This is understandable since almost all return policies incur buyback price. That is why vast researches pay more attention to buyback price. [3] demonstrates that a policy to offer full credit to the buyer for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination and the supplier can get any percentage of channel profit by setting proper wholesale price and buyback price. There are many restrictions about setting. For example, when the retail price which affects is endogenous, the buyback contract no longer coordinates the supply chain [8] . For more complex setting, the other contract will with buyback to improve the performance [7] , [10] .
Though both buyback policy and return policy decide buyback price, there are remarkable difference between them. That is, return policy incurs reverse logistics, but buyback policy may not incur reverse logistics. Most studies about buyback policy or return policy do not consider reverse logistics. Recently, more attention is devoted to the logistics of return policies. [11] shows that the development of e-commerce in electronic market increases the value of surplus products. [12] reviews return contract and illustrates the decision of contract when consider cost of the return good. [13] investigates a supply chain consider the forward logistics and reverse logistics simultaneously.
Most studies to date on return policy have assumed that the salvage value is same for all member of supply chain. But for some products, such as electronic products and books, the excess products should been reprocessed or delivered to another substitute channel if resend them to the supplier. Therefore, the value of excess goods may be higher for the supplier than for the retailer. This is a foundation assumption for return policy. On the other hand, the paper investigating buyback contract considers the logistics is rare. Furthermore, the majority of supply chain coordination researches assume a symmetric information situation. Because of the variety and complexity of logistics activities, the accurate cost accounting is troublesome. It is difficult to estimate the expenses of the returned purchase when the return activities are managed by the retailer. This paper considers an asymmetric information about the cost of returned goods.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the assumptions and notations. In Section 3, the integrated model is discussed firstly. In Section 4, the return policy under symmetric information situation is investigated. Section 5 focuses on the return policy for an asymmetric information relationship. Section 6 gives the numerical analysis. Section 7 summarizes the findings.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS
The either l with probability of ρ or l with probability of1 ρ − . The buyback contract is a practical method for the supplier to share risks and losses of the retailer. We denote r as the buyback price, which is the decision variable of the supplier as well as w . In asymmetric information situation, the supplier should offer retailers a menu of returns policies trading off l -type retailer with l -type retailer. The one goal of the supplier's contract is to coordinate the supply chain and the other is to maximize the supplier profit. Let l -type retailer's ordering size is ( ) Q l , the expected surplus and sale are ( ) O l and ( ) S l . Simply calculating gives
The total expected profit of the channel is
III. THE INTEGRATED MODEL
The goal of this paper is to develop a return policy to coordinate the supply chain. The coordination of supply chain means the decision in decentralized enable the channel to obtain the same profits as a vertically integrated firm's. In order to give a benchmark for follows discussion, in this section, we first focus on an integrated structure in which both the supplier and the retailer agree to take decisions to maximize the total channel profits (joint profit maximization).
We denote the optimal order size and the maximum expected profit of the channel by
. Using Leibniz's rule to obtain the first and second derivatives shows that ( ) m r l + ∏ is concave. The sufficient optimality condition is the well-known formula:
and substituting from (5) into (2) and simplifying gives the optimal expected profit: , one has
The higher l means the higher the cost, thus this conclusion is intuitional.
For the convenience in presentation is follows subsections, let
IV. THE RETURN POLICY UNDER SYMMETRIC
INFORMATION SITUATION
For the sake of comparing, before investigate the asymmetric information situation, now we discuss the problem of channel coordination by return policy with common knowledge about l . When the supplier know the retailer's cost l , the supplier first declares the wholesale price w and buyback price r . The retailer, as the follower sets the decision of ordering size ( ) 
the combined contract of wholesale price and buyback policy can coordinate the supply chain and has the follows properties: Proposition 2 shows that when the supplier takes the contract (10) to coordinate the supply chain, the buyback price the supplier offers is higher than his savage value. Furthermore, the buyback price should increase with the increase of wholesale price, the supplier's savage value and the retailer's logistics cost. If this buyback does not incur reverse transportation, the dominant supplier can get any percentage of the channel profit. However, when the retailer return the excess products, the logistics cost will impose restrictions on the supplier's profit, and the higher l leads to the lower profit.
V. THE RETURN POLICY UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION SITUATION
Assume now the supplier cannot confirm the retailer is l -type or l -type. That is, the supplier has only the retailer's reported cost value, denoted by f l . There is no reason to assume that the retailer will report honestly " f l " as the same as the real value. In this section, we discuss how to develop a policy to coordinate the supply chain. The key factor for success in coordinating the supply chain is to make the l -type retailer report honestly, i.e. f l l = Accordance with "the revelation principle" [14] , the contract should satisfies "incentive compatibility constraint" and "participate constraint", simultaneously.
From Proposition 2, consider the contract menu * * {( , , ( )), ( , , ( ))} w r Q l w r Q l : 
We assume that the reserved profit of the retailer is the profit which she can get in decentralized setting without the supplier's buyback policy. In this model, the supplier set the optimal wholesale price which maximizes his profit. We denote the retailer profit by 
From (11) 
Therefore, the constraint condition of (11) 
and the derivative of
Thus, The sensitivity analysis of * * , β β are listed in Tables 1-3 . Tables 1-3 show that
The greater l ∆ means more uncertainty of the supplier about the retailer's type and it is disadvantageous for the supplier. Table 2 shows that 
II. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has formulated a supply chain coordination problem with asymmetric information between one supplier and one retailer for a single-period product. This paper assumes that the salvage value of unsold products is higher for the supplier than for the retailer. The supplier wants to coordinate by proper return contract. In this return policy we assume that the excess goods refunded by the retailer and the cost of reverse logistics is asymmetric information. This paper formulates a contract menu with return price and wholesale price. The observations are developed and show that this contract menu enables the retailer report the logistics cost honestly and can achieve the coordination. The solution of this contract menu is derived, and the numerical examples illustrate that the greater variation of the supplier's estimation about the logistics cost is disadvantageous for the supplier. The greater variation will produce more harm to the supplier who has the higher cost.
There a number of possible extensions of our study that can constitute future research endeavors in this area. One immediate extension is to consider the cooperating reverse logistics between the channel members. Developing better contract menu to deal with the asymmetric information is another interesting theme.
